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IT project management is plagued by its inability to stop projects that ultimately fail. This persistent problem results in the 
loss of scarce resources and IT departments unable to generate full value for money invested. There is considerable evidence 
to suggest that information asymmetry is a significant contributor to this waste. The Balanced Scorecard is a framework that 
has been widely employed in business as a tool to translate the organizational vision into workable business plans and a 
framework  for  effective  communication  amongst  stakeholders.  Stage-gates  are  a  widely-used  method  in  new  product 
development and they are gradually making inroads into software project governance. Using a model based on Balanced 
Scorecard and Stage-gates, this study proposes how their use in IT project governance can mitigate the effects of information 
asymmetry and thereby increase the likelihood of terminating an uneconomical project quickly.  
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INTRODUCTION
The Standish Group’s Chaos Report 2006  indicated that 65 percent of Information Technology projects reach challenged or 
failed status each year (Rubinstein, 2007).  In October 2005, one of Britain’s largest food retailers wrote off a $526 million 
supply-chain system and hired 3,000 additional store clerks to manually stock the shelves (Charette, 2005).  In April 2005, 
the FBI gave up on its Virtual Case File (VCF) project after investing $170 million, leaving it with the same pre-9/11 case 
management system as before, and that system was five years more antiquated than when the VCF project began (Goldstein, 
2005).
This paper will focus on the problem of unwarranted project continuation; continued support for a project that will fail to 
generate full value for the money invested.  If managers always acted as completely rational economic actors, they would 
discontinue support for a project as soon as they perceived that it would end up with a negative economic return.  This paper 
will not focus on the closely-related problem of IT project escalation in which “there is continued commitment and negative 
information”  (Keil, 1995).  In IT project escalation, the project does not stay on schedule and budget with the specified level 
of quality.  Sometimes an escalated project can result in a good economic return, but with unwarranted project continuation 
this is never the case.  Unwarranted project continuation would include a project that stayed within schedule and budget 
parameters while providing the product or service requested, but ultimately yielded a negative economic return to the firm.
Previous research has identified information asymmetry,  one of  the key problems identified within agency theory,  as a 
significant contributor to the problem of project escalation (Keil, Mann and Rai, 2000).  In information asymmetry, the agent 
has  information  not  available  to  the  principal.   The  standard  measures  taken  by  the  principal  to  reduce  information 
asymmetry involve closely monitoring the agent via regular reports and project status meetings (Müller and Turner, 2005). 
While these measures can be helpful, judging from the high levels of unwarranted project continuation, they are insufficient. 
What is needed is a mechanism with an emphasis on identifying projects that will fail to deliver a positive economic return so 
they can be discontinued as early as possible thereby avoiding wasted resources.  This paper proposes an addition to standard 
project  governance  practices  that  is  expected  to  reduce  information  asymmetry  and  thereby  reduce  the  incidence  of 
unwarranted project continuation.
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BACKGROUND
The traditional approach to rational decision-making derived from economic theory assumes a firm's managers will reach 
decisions intended to maximize the profitability of their firms. Managers should invest resources in the projects expected to 
provide the greatest profits to the firm and then periodically evaluate the actual economic performance of those projects. 
They  should  continue  the  projects  expected  to  be  profitable  and,  to  avoid  losses,  discontinue  those  expected  to  be 
unprofitable.  However, in reality it is common to observe continued managerial support for projects that ultimately become 
unprofitable;  an estimated 30% to 40% of all  IS  projects fail  to meet their  schedule,  budget,  and quality requirements, 
standard indicators of a project that will ultimately fail (Keil et al., 2000).
This research is grounded in agency theory with a specific focus on the problem of information asymmetry (Keil, et al, 2000, 
Austin, 2001).  An agency relationship is a contract under which one party (the principal) engages another party (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  In the project governance context, the agent is the project manager charged with meeting the project goals 
set by the principal i.e., the executive sponsor of the project.  In a larger sense, the principal could also be the firm with which 
the executive is identified.  For the purposes of this research, the project sponsor will be called the executive; they have the 
resources at their disposal, as well as the decision-making authority to continue or discontinue a project. 
In a principal-agent relationship, when the agent has private information and an incentive to shirk their responsibilities, they 
are  likely to act  in  their  own self-interest  at  the expense of  the principal.  A failing IT  project  is  particularly prone to 
information asymmetry.  In this situation, private information would take the form of the project manager (agent) having 
knowledge indicating the project is likely to fail to deliver a positive economic return to the principal (the firm).  The project 
manager (PM) would have a personal interest in maintaining their reputation as a successful PM and not finishing a project 
would be almost certain to damage their reputation.  Even though a project would yield a negative economic outcome for the 
principal, the PM’s career considerations are a strong incentive to shirk their responsibility to admit that the project should be 
discontinued.  Given a PM with information asymmetry and an incentive to shirk their responsibilities to the principal, that 
PM would be likely to seek to continue the failing project at the expense of the firm.  In a laboratory experiment, it was 
demonstrated that subjects were more likely to continue with a questionable project when they were manipulated to believe 
that they possessed private information about the project's prospects for success and that a decision to discontinue a project 
would damage their reputation and potentially harm their career (Harrison and Harrell, 1993). Prior research has determined 
that information asymmetry is a significant contributor to projects that are allowed to continue beyond the point at which they 
should have been terminated (Keil et al., 2000). 
If a principal can closely monitor an agent's actions, a condition of information symmetry between the parties prevails.  In this 
situation, a PM with an incentive to shirk would be less likely to do so because the principal would know the agent was 
shirking. In such an environment, it is in the best interests of the agent to discontinue a failing project because the principal 
will also know the project is failing. 
Balanced Scorecard
One commonly-used mechanism for collecting and disseminating information is the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) framework 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992).  Managers using the BSC framework take into account multiple perspectives when decisions are 
made.  The framework provides a system of checks and balances so that the major stakeholders in the firm and the four BSC 
perspectives (Financial, Customer, Process, and Learning & growth) are represented in decision-making.  The adoption of 
BSC means every manager and executive of a firm routinely participates in multiple perspective decision-making (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996).  The emphasis on multiple perspectives and their communication among subject matter experts in each 
perspective  would be expected  to  reduce  information asymmetry as  behaviors  undertaken  by agents  within the firm to 
conceal private information are likely to be less successful than in a firm not utilizing BSC.
When a firm completely implements the Balanced Scorecard framework, every aspect  of the firm is managed within it, 
including the Project Management governance of the firm.  The Balanced Scorecard provides tools to facilitate multi-criteria 
decision-making by the key stakeholders of the firm.  All activities of the firm are managed according to a balancing of the 
four major perspectives with this framework driving the information collection and dissemination practices throughout the 
firm.  Every manager is judged and rewarded according to their functional area's performance relative to its' portion of the 
overall firm's Balanced Scorecard.  In previous research, project management within a Balanced Scorecard framework has 
been shown to deliver better project performance results (Norrie and Walker, 2004).
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Stage-Gates
Borrowed from the marketing realm, a popular mechanism for decision-making is Stage-Gates™, a process in which a new 
product must be vetted multiple times during the development process, from origin to completion.  Stage-gates originated in 
response to an 82 percent failure rate for new product efforts (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1993).  The benefits of Stage-gates 
have led to their incorporation into Project Management Frameworks such as PRINCE 2.  Stage-gate decision meetings are 
held before the start of each project stage and a go/kill decision is made to determine if the project should continue.  This 
normally  will  involve  a  few,  relevant  project  stakeholders  participating  in  the  decision-making  process.  Numerous 
organizations have adopted Stage-gates for IT project governance and yet unwarranted project continuation has not been fully 
mitigated with resulting wastage of resources and falling behind the competition(Cooper, 2008).  In a Stage-gate governance 
environment, if a project manager is withholding information about the project’s likely negative outcome, they will have to 
withhold that information at every Stage-gate until the project is completed.  Given the  career impact for a manager that is  
eventually found out, this process is likely to reduce the incidence of information asymmetry.  
CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Balanced Scorecard is a framework that has been widely employed in business as a tool to translate the organizational vision 
into workable business plans and a framework for effective communication amongst stakeholders. By providing multiple 
sources  and  perspectives  on  project  performance  to  the  executive  sponsor  (principal),  the  BSC framework  can  reduce 
information asymmetry by taking away the agent’s  control  over  private information.  In  the application of  the BSC to 
projects, a project can conceptually and simply be seen as a mini-company (Martinsons, Davison and Tse, 1999; Stewart and 
Carpenter-Hubin, 2001) and that company’s goals must be kept in line with the overall corporate business strategy and the 
key stakeholder requirements.  
The application of the Balanced Scorecard to IT project governance will involve: 
1. Setting the project vision in line with the business goals of the organization.
2. Translating the project vision into measurable goals.  The scorecard forces the stakeholders of the project such as the 
executive,  the  project  manager,  senior  customer  representative,  the  program  management  office  (PMO) 
representative or portfolio manager and corporate finance to arrive at an agreement on the metrics they will use to 
operationalize their project vision.  By cascading the overarching project goals into objectives and measures for each 
group, the project’s Balanced Scorecard provides a mechanism for alignment of all the project stakeholders and lays 
the foundation for effective communication among the stakeholders.
3. Feedback and Learning: This BSC perspective will ensure that previous projects contribute know-how to the current 
projects and that the firm's store of knowledge is enhanced through lessons learned in current projects to aid the firm 
in future projects.  By supplying a formal mechanism for fact-based feedback and review, the Balanced Scorecard 
helps an organization foster learning and growth. 
The proposed Balanced Scorecard metrics (Table 1) capture how well the project is being executed, and whether it is on 
course and on target.  Poor performance on these metrics need not be a kill indicator, but a strong signal that the project and 
team could be in trouble, and that course corrections are needed. 
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Stage-gates in the Model
For an effective stage-gate system to work, prior research suggests the following guidelines (Cooper, 2008): 
1. Governance roles must be carefully identified. The gatekeepers should be senior people in the business who own the 
resources required for the project leader and team to move forward. They are also people who can make the project 
go/kill decisions. The gatekeepers must be a small team, typically consisting of the business executive, the project 
manager, the senior customer representative, the PMO representative or portfolio manager, and corporate finance.  
2. The gates must be associated with real project consequences.  They should be used to reach a go/kill decision and 
used for resourcing if the project is continuing to the next stage. 
3. Rules of engagement must be put in place.  This ensures that all stakeholders/participants understand how they are to 
communicate and participate in the go/kill decision.  
4. Gates must be lean and simple. The gates should not impose a high informational requirement from the project team 
members. To avoid information asymmetry, the information sources for the four perspectives should come from the 

















Figure 1: Use of the Balanced Scorecard at Stage-gates
There are numerous benefits  of  using Stages-gates  in  product management.  Most  best-practice product companies  have 
implemented a robust idea-to-launch system, such as Stage-Gate®1 (Griffin, 1997; Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt, 2002, 
2005). The benefits of such a process have been well documented and many well-known companies, such as Proctor & 
Gamble, Emerson Electric, ITT, and 3M, have profited from using Stage-gates (Cooper 2008).  In a study on the use of  
Balanced Scorecard in IT project alignment it was observed that using a BSC framework to make IT projects align with 
overall  corporate  strategy can  possibly improve  the  traditional  project  deliverables:  on-time,  on-budget,  and  on-quality. 
These researchers  found that,  “using the BSC in project  settings  facilitates  a  wider  perspective on project  management 
successes and facilitates a team’s linking to a wider range of strategic performance indicators that it can use to appropriately 
develop a clearer project vision and to more clearly monitor and control individual project goals and objectives” (Norrie and 
Walker, 2004).
Summary of the BSC-Stage-Gate Model
The Balanced Scorecard with Stage-gates framework brings together the representatives of all four BSC perspectives in a 
format  that  provides independent  sources  of  information to the decision-maker.   These representatives  will  typically be 
subject matter experts with significant stakes in the project which should encourage them to ask the project manager the 
“hard questions” that might otherwise not be asked.  
A Theoretical Example of the BSC-Stage-Gate Model in Practice
A major internal software development project at Company X has reached the threshold for the BSC-Stage-gate governance 
model  supervised  by  the  PMO  and  it  has  cleared  the  First  Stage-gate.   At  each  subsequent  project  stage-gate,  the 
representatives of the four BSC perspectives, the project manager and the project's executive sponsor participate in a meeting. 
Second Stage-gate: Financial and Customer issues
− The PM provides a BSC-relevant project status report to the assembled stakeholders.  As part of this report, routine 
metrics are covered such as the project's progress relative to cost and schedule, and the software defect rate.  
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− The Financial perspective representative points out that the project is 15 percent over budget, presenting a threat to 
its' required positive economic return.  The Customer perspective representative cautions that an early functionality 
milestone was missed.
− The PM outlines a plan to reduce the project's spending rate later in the project.  After the PM points out that key 
users have not previously been made available for functionality verification, the Customer perspective representative 
agrees to provide these users to assist the programmers in resolving functionality issues before the next Stage-gate is 
reached.
− The Executive sponsor determines that the economic return is still positive and decides to continue the project.
Third Stage-gate: Process and Learning & growth issues
− The PM provides a BSC-relevant project status report to the assembled stakeholders.  The PM recommends the 
project's continuation according to plan.
− The PMO (Process)  representative  highlights  that  the project's  software  defect  rate  of 0.2 defects  per thousand 
function  points  is  double  the  firm's  standard  for  this  point  in  a  project.   The  Learning  & growth  perspective 
representative points out that a module that would provide a function that fits with an upcoming initiative should 
now be elevated in priority and fully resourced.
− The PM explains that a key Quality Assurance (QA) tester was lost, leading to the high defect rate.  As far as the 
Learning & growth-related module, the PM requests extra resources which threaten the project's budget.
− The PMO identifies a QA tester that can be transferred from a project that is winding down.  The tester will be 
shifted to this project soon after this Stage-gate meeting.  Additionally, the PMO recommends the reuse of some 
code in the company's software repository to form the core of the Learning & growth-related module.  The reuse of 
this code eliminates the need for an additional resource and helps keep the project within its budget.
− Since this project will provide a positive economic return and contribute to an upcoming initiative, the Executive 
sponsor reaches a go decision, allowing the project to continue to the next stage.  
Any one of the issues cited in the theoretical example above may not been brought to light for corrective actions without the 
combined BSC and Stage-gate framework.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the discussions above and evidence from existing literature,  this research proposes that the use of a combined 
Balanced Scorecard and Stage-gate framework is likely to provide more effective project governance than existing practices. 
The Balanced Scorecard framework and Stage-gates have been successfully implemented for IT projects independently of 
one another.   This research recommends combining the two as a way to reduce information asymmetry with thorough, 
strategically-aligned, ongoing reviews of projects. 
Proposition  1:  Using  the  Balanced  Scorecard  framework  at  Stage-gates  will  reduce  information  asymmetry  in  project 
governance. 
Proposition 2: Using the Balanced Scorecard framework at Stage-gates will improve the likelihood of early termination of 
projects that would otherwise yield negative economic returns.
Implications for Practice and Research
For IT project practitioners, the use of the Balanced Scorecard framework at Stage-gates will reduce information asymmetry 
and result in better project governance decisions.  This will lead to early detection of projects that will not add economic 
value  to  the  firm and  enable  executives  to  make informed and  timely decisions  for  their  discontinuation.   The  timely 
decisions to stop unwarranted project continuation will lead to reduction in waste of resources and result in IT delivering 
increased business value to the firm.  Future research involving an empirically tested simulation game of this proposed model 
is planned.
Limitations for Practitioners
Previous research has indicated that a strict adherence to the Stage-gate process tends to discourage the development of 
novel, new products and to impair corporate learning (Sethi and Iqbal, 2008).  As a result, a limitation of this research is that 
if  project  governance  teams  apply  Balanced  Scorecard  to  Stage-gates  in  a  too-strict  manner,  it  may  discourage  the 
introduction of novel, “game-changing” IT projects.  This is a serious concern as novel IT projects are often those offering 
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the greatest risks  and rewards.  This also has implications for the proposed model’s Learning perspective of the Balanced 
Scorecard in project Stage-gates.
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